

DDA Registry

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81-00142R00060007B008-4  
~~File Security~~

22 MAY 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH: Deputy to the DCI for Support  
FROM: Robert W. Cambone  
Chairman, DCI Security Committee  
SUBJECT: Proposed Security Items for Agenda  
6 June 1978 and July 1978 NFIB Meetings

25X1

25X1

1.  Action Requested:

(a) That you approve as agenda items for the  
6 June 1978 NFIB Meeting:

(1) Revision of DCID 1/16, "Security of  
Foreign Intelligence in Automated Data Pro-  
cessing Systems and Networks";

(2) Proposed DCID 1/xx, "Security Policy  
Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel  
with Access to Sensitive Compartmented  
Information";

(3) Proposed DCID 1/xx, "Uniform  
Procedures for Administrative Handling  
and Accountability of Sensitive Compart-  
mented Information":

(b) The circulation to NFIB members for comment  
the Security Committee draft DCID 1/xx, "Compart-  
mentation."

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2.  Background:

(a) Following appropriate coordination the  
proposed DCIDs listed under (a) above were scheduled for

E-2 IMPDET

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discussion at the 14 March 1978 NFIB Meeting but were superseded by other issues. Community members continue their interests in the substantive matters represented and it appears desirable to reschedule them as agenda items.

(b) In January 1978 and again in March General Tighe solicited DCI support for early NFIB action on a proposed DCID on compartmentation. Sharp divisions in the community have stalled action at our level on trying to develop a directive establishing clear policies on what should be compartmented and effective procedures for doing so. Currently the "collectors/producers" such as COMIREX and the SIGINT Committee hold security authorities under their enabling DCIDs. The "users" view this arrangement as institutionalizing a bias in favor of overly protective and unreceptivity to needs for access under readily manageable conditions. The proposed DCID makes the Security Committee itself responsible for determining the feasibility of protecting the information at either the compartmented or collateral levels.

This draft DCID was to be addressed at the 14 March 1978 meeting of the NFIB as part of the "Security" agenda. It was not. It is noted that the draft has not been circulated for NFIB member comments. It is proposed that this be done now and that it be scheduled for discussion at a mid-July meeting of the NFIB.

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3.  Attached for your information are:

TAB A: Revision of DCID 1/16 "Security of Foreign Intelligence in Automated Data Processing Systems and Networks" and NFIB member comments;

TAB B: Proposed DCID 1/xx "Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information" and NFIB member comments;

TAB C: Proposed DCID 1/xx "Uniform Procedures for Administrative Handling and Accountability of Sensitive Compartmented Information" and NFIB member comments;

TAB D: Draft DCID 1/xx "Compartmentation" and a copy of General Tighe's memorandum soliciting your support.

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4.  Recommendation: It is recommended that you approve:

(a) Scheduling the three DCIDs listed in Paragraph 1 (a) on the agenda of the 6 June 1978 NFIB Meeting;

(b) Circulating to NFIB members for comment the draft DCID on Compartmentation Policy and scheduling it for discussion at the mid-July 1978 NFIB Meeting.

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Robert W. Gambino

Att.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:

Orig - Return to C/SECOM  
1 - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - D/DCI/Support  
1 - Executive Registry

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15 September 1977

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NFIB Votes on Draft DCID 1/16

CIA	Concurs
State	No comment
DIA	Comments
NSA	Comments
Treasury	No comment
ERDA	No comment
FBI	Concurs
Navy	Comments
Air Force	Comments
(None)	Comments

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**Next 26 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

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14 NOV 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon  
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/16, "Security of Foreign  
Intelligence in Automated Data Processing  
Systems and Networks" [redacted]

REFERENCE: Memorandum to DCI, DCI/IC 77-1925, dated  
3 August 1977

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25X1 1. [redacted] Action Requested: That you approve the attached proposed DCID 1/16 as a future NFIB agenda item.

25X1 2. [redacted] Background: In the reference you approved the circulation to NFIB members for comment the Security Committee version of an updated and revised draft DCID 1/16. Comments have now been returned to the NFIB Secretariat and the consensus opinion supports the draft DCID as circulated. Some recommended editorial changes have been incorporated in the attached version of the DCID; however, the substantive thrust remains unchanged. The areas of basic disagreement are the same as reported out of the Security Committee in referenced memorandum.

25X1 a. [redacted] One area of conflict comes from the desire of the DIA member of NFIB, supported by the military services, to have added an expanded compartmented mode as an authorized mode of computer operations. This expanded compartmented mode concept would permit personnel cleared for SECRET material to have access to an ADP system containing Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). This authorization is "considered essential for planning, research and development to meet existing operational requirements, and to assure full utilization of existing computer resources."

25X1 b. [redacted] The Navy representative to NFIB in supporting this view stated that the efficiency of many systems could be improved significantly if selective operations were allowed under the expanded compartmented mode. He further stated that system hardware and software would be required to provide reasonable

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assurances that SCI and TOP SECRET data would not be accessed by persons cleared for only SECRET material.

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c. [redacted] Herein lies the problem: Current technology cannot give us a reasonable assurance of positive verification of user clearance and shut-out mechanisms which would permit a secure multi-level computer operation. The development of these techniques, systems and procedures are still a few years away. Therefore, the operation of an ADP system in an expanded compartmented mode technically gives a SECRET-cleared person access to SCI contained in the ADP system. Access to SCI requires a TOP SECRET clearance based upon the investigative standards set forth in DCID 1/14, "Minimum Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information." There is no Community standard for the issuance of a SECRET clearance.

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d. [redacted] The other unresolved issue concerns these clearance standards. In paragraph 4.b of the DCID, temporary periods of relief are authorized NFIB members when compliance with the DCID would significantly impair the execution of his mission. No exception can be made to the minimum requirement that a TOP SECRET clearance be based on a background investigation for access to ADP systems or networks containing SCI. The NSA member recommends a footnote requiring that this TOP SECRET clearance be based on DCID 1/14 requirements as is normally the case. He fears that this language could be interpreted as permitting lesser standards and be seized upon as the norm.

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e. [redacted] On the other hand, the DIA member feels that the requirement for a background investigation would be a hardship since a TOP SECRET clearance based on a background investigation would then be required for DOD personnel accessing collateral intelligence information in an ADP system containing SCI. Currently the DOD permits collateral TOP SECRET access based upon a National Agency check and ten years service. They feel that without allocation of resources, placing these additional requirements in an already overburdened system would appear to be counterproductive.

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f. [redacted] Two options available are:

- (1) That you approve the DCID as supported by the consensus opinion of NFIB. This issuance would provide a computer security policy compatible with the current state-of-the-art.

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/16, "Security of Foreign Intelligence  
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070008-4" [redacted]

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(2) Refer the DCID to the NFIB Secretariat to process as an NFIB agenda item.

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3. [redacted] Recommendation: Recognizing that we must have a viable security policy for those computer operations in use and being planned, and that DOD could have resource problems in its implementation, referral to the NFIB Secretariat, Option (2), is recommended.

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[redacted]  
John N. McManon

Attachment:  
Proposed DCID 1/16



APPROVED:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: 16 JUL 1981

SUBJECT Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070008-4  
in Automated Data Processing Systems and Networks" [redacted]

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Distribution: DCI/IC 77-1935  
Orig. - Addressee (rtn to ICS) w/att.  
1 - DCI w/att.  
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1 - A/D/DCI/IC w/att.  
1 - IC Registry w/att.  
1 - SECOM Subj. File w/att.  
1 - SECOM Chrono w/att.

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DCI/IC/SECOM: [redacted] 8Nov77

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

VOTE

SUBJECT : Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment  
of Personnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented  
Information  
REFERENCE : NFIB-9.3/17

DUE DATE : 21 December 1977

STATINTL

Agency	Vote	By	Date
CIA	CONCUR		12/22/77
State	CONCUR	Saunders	12/21/77
DIA	CONCUR		(Acting) 1/18/78
NSA	Comments Attached	Inman	1/6/78
TREASURY	CONCUR	Collins	12/22/78
ENERGY	Deferring response until the issue regarding appendix is resolved by Security committed per Lee Martin		
FBI	CONCUR	Weimar	12/22/77
OSD			
D/DCI/CT			
NFAC			STATINTL
Approved by D/DCI/IC on:	CONCUR COMMENTS ATT CONCUR		12/21/77 12/20/78 12/29/77
Approved by DCI on:			
Record			

ApprovATIONAL COMMISSION INTELLIGENCE BOARD 070008-4

NFIB-9.3/17  
7 December 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD


FROM : Walter Elder  
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT : Proposed DCID No. 1/XXX, "Security Policy  
Concerning Travel and Assignment of  
Personnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented  
Information"

1. The Acting Vice Chairman has approved a recommendation from the Security Committee to circulate the attached proposed DCID for your consideration. An earlier draft was considered by NFIB in June 1976 and was remanded to the Security Committee for further study. The current version reflects the results of that extensive investigation.

NFIB ACTION REQUESTED

2. You are requested to notify the NFIB Secretariat of your concurrence in or other comments on the proposed DCID and its appendix by close of business, 21 December 1977.



Walter Elder

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Attachment:

As Stated

Copy \_\_\_\_ of 35

Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)  
Automatically declassified on  
Date Impossible to Determine

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DCI/IC 77-1939

5 DEC 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon  
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy

REFERENCE: Memo for USIB (USIB-D-9.6/6), dated 1 April 1963,  
Subject: "Procedures for Foreign Travel of  
Personnel Possessing Special Security  
Clearances"

1. Action Requested: Approval for NFIB vote sheet action on a draft DCID setting security policy on travel and assignment of personnel with access to compartmented intelligence.

2. Background: Restrictions on the travel or assignment of persons having or having had access to compartmented intelligence have been in effect for some twenty years. Current Community policy on this subject dates from 1963 (see reference). A perception that the circumstances which justified the policy had changed, questions about the legal enforceability of travel restrictions, and diverging implementation of the policy by different agencies, prompted a proposed revision of the policy. NFIB consideration of that proposal resulted in the Board remanding an earlier draft DCID to the Security Committee for (1) exploration with legal counsel of enforceability questions, and (2) more precise definition of particularly sensitive information, access to which should trigger more travel restrictions than might otherwise be appropriate. The legal issue bears on authority to restrict the unofficial travel of persons having access to sensitive national security information in the interests of better protecting that information.

3. Staff Position:

a. The consensus of Community legal staffs is that, while U.S. citizens have a Constitutional right to travel, the courts would quite possibly uphold agency restrictions against private travel to risky areas if there was a "strong factual situation; for example, current practices of a country of detaining, harassing or provoking...persons [with access to sensitive information] for the purpose of extracting information from

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SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy

them." There are no recent cases documented in which persons with access to compartmented intelligence were detained, harassed, or provoked during private travel to Communist countries to try to force or trick them to divulge sensitive information. The harassments and provocations occasionally encountered by Americans in Communist countries have other objectives--warning local citizens against contact with Americans, trying to frustrate possible intelligence activities by the Americans, and seeking to identify weaknesses in the Americans which could be exploited for espionage recruitment. The application of travel restrictions is very inconsistent. They are waived by some agencies, stringently applied by others. However private travel of cleared persons to risky areas has been handled, it has not contributed to any known compromise of sensitive intelligence. Thus, there does not appear to be any demonstrable need to restrict private travel for security reasons, or any likelihood of supporting in court a stringent policy restricting such travel.

b. Prudent security, however, argues that persons with access to sensitive intelligence should be briefed on potential dangers that might befall them during travel to or through countries adverse to the United States. The policy proposed in the attached draft DCID would require such persons to: (1) give advance notice of planned travel, (2) receive a defensive security briefing before leaving, and (3) report to official U.S. authorities any security incidents affecting them during travel. The proposed policy would apply more rigorously to those few persons with access to exceptionally sensitive information on the specific sources and methods of compartmented intelligence (e.g., specific reconnaissance capabilities, cryptologic targets, or successes).

c. This subject has been dealt with at considerable length by the Security Committee and the Community. All Community agencies except NSA have been pressing for a more realistic policy which would balance known circumstances of travel against limits on authority to restrict travel, operational requirements, and prudent security precautions. NSA's opposition to a change has been strong. Their position may have changed. When Vice Admiral Inman was Director of Naval Intelligence, he actively supported a change in security policy along the lines of that in the attached draft DCID.

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SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy

4. Recommendation: That you approve circulation of the attached draft DCID to the NFIB for vote sheet action, and if this should not result in Community agreement, schedule this subject for discussion at an NFIB meeting with a view towards resolving this issue.

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[Redacted]  
John N. McMahon

Attachment:  
Draft DCID

25X1A

APPROVED: [Redacted]  
 Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: 5 Dec 77

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

VOTE

SUBJECT : Proposed DCID 1/XX, "Uniform Procedures for  
Administrative Handling and Accountability of  
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)"

REFERENCE : NFIB-9.3/18, 21 December 1978. STATINTL

DUE DATE : COB, 10 January 1978.

Agency	Vote	By	Date
CIA	CONCUR		1/10/78
State	CONCUR	Kirk	1/4/78
DIA	CONCUR	Tighe	1/12/78
NSA	COMMENTS ATT.	Inman	1/23/78
TREASURY	CONCUR	Collins	1/10/78
ENERGY	CONCUR	Lee Martin	1/5/78
FBI	CONCUR	Weimar	1/11/78
OSD	COMMENTS ATTA.		STATINTL 1/28/78
D/DCI/CT			
NFAC	*See note per Ambassador Little (Attached)		
	COMMENTS ATTACHED		1/10/78

Approved by STATINTL  
D/DCI/IC on:

Approved by DCI on:

Record

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WZ

NFIB-9.3/18  
21 December 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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
FROM : [REDACTED]  
Deputy Executive Secretary

SUBJECT : Proposed DCID 1/XX, "Uniform Procedures for  
Administrative Handling and Accountability  
of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)

1. The Chairman has approved circulation of the attached proposed DCID for your consideration.

NFIB ACTION REQUESTED

2. You are requested to notify the NFIB Secretariat of your concurrence by close of business, 10 January 1978.



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Attachment:  
As Stated

Copy 25 of 35

Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)  
Automatically declassified on  
Date Impossible to Determine

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10 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Walter Elder  
Executive Secretary, NFIB

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FROM: [REDACTED]  
Chairman, COMIREX

SUBJECT: Comments on Proposed DCID 1/XX,  
"Uniform Procedures for Administrative  
Handling and Accountability of Sensitive  
Compartmented Information (SCI)"

REFERENCE: NFIB-D-9.3/18, 21 December 1977

1. There are three parts of the draft DCID that we believe could or would create problems with reference to TK matters, specifically:

a. The language of paragraph 3 of the covering memorandum, which bears the signature of the DCI, could be wrongly interpreted that the D/NRO, as an "operational program director," would now have the authority to make policy on release to foreign governments. Since that is not the intention, recommend that the paragraph be rephrased in the following manner:

"This directive is not intended to limit the authority and responsibilities of Executive Agent or other operational program directors, or the SCI Control Officials designated by the DCI, for management of other aspects of their respective programs, such as basic operational direction, and policy guidance on security classifications and controls and dissemination to foreign governments."

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[REDACTED]  
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[Redacted]

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b. Literal adherence to the provisions on pages 11-13 that deal with the "Minimum Standards for Control of SCI Released to Contractors or Consultants" might be construed as in conflict with key aspects of the 28 December 1977 COMIREX Memorandum D-2.10/2, which outlines the guidelines on Contractor Holdings of TALENT-KEYHOLE Imagery. To resolve the conflicts between the policy guidance in the two documents suggest the following two changes to the proposed DCID:

(1) Security Regulation, page 11, para 3.

Change as follows:

"The sponsoring agency ensures that such releases are in conformity with the contractor policy directives formulated for the specific types of SCI involved."

(2) Security Regulation, page 13.

Change as follows:

"When specifically required by the contractor for another contract by another sponsoring agency-- provided that the requisite security safeguards and accountability procedures specified by this directive continue to be maintained by the contractor or consultant, and provided that the second sponsoring agency assumes monitoring responsibility for the SCI materials to be retained."

2. A final point about timing the issuance of this proposed DCID. I strongly recommend deferral of approval or other further consideration of this proposed DCID at the present time for the following reason. It would reflect poor management to issue this DCID with its five references to Executive Order 11652, including the concept of a General Declassification Schedule, and then find within the next month or two the President has approved the currently proposed Executive Order on "National Security Information," which revokes Executive Order 11652, and promulgates a declassification approach different from the current General Declassification Schedule. Since this proposed Executive Order has already reached the final draft stage, with comments required no later than January 20, a delay in issuing the proposed DCID is

[Redacted]  
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
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
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definitely in order. Once the Executive Order is approved, the proposed DCID should be appropriately modified so as to conform with its provisions, and then re-submitted to the DCI and NFIB for consideration.



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Executive Sec. by  
77-10524

DCI/IC 77-1938

10LC 107

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon  
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Proposed DCID 1/XX, "Uniform Procedures for  
Administrative Handling and Accountability  
of Sensitive Compartmented Information  
(SCI)" [redacted]

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25X1 1. [redacted] Action Requested: That you approve the circulation of  
the attached proposed DCID to NFIB principals for concurrence and/or  
other comments.

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2. [redacted] Background:

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a. This proposed DCID was prepared in order to simplify  
through uniformity the administrative procedures for the control  
of compartmented information in the various programs under the  
cognizance of the DCI. While there are similarities in the  
control procedures for TALENT-KEYHOLE, COMINT, [redacted]  
control systems, each system has its own security regulation.

b. This DCID brings all of the administrative procedures  
for the security control and handling of SCI materials together  
in one security regulation to facilitate understanding and  
compliance.

c. All of the Intelligence Community agencies support this  
draft DCID except NSA. NSA feels that since the Communications  
Intelligence Security Regulations (CISR), DCID 6/3, provides  
security policy, including administrative handling, for the entire  
COMINT community, this DCID should not be applicable to COMINT  
information. They also have difficulty with the concept of an  
SCI Security Control Center as the focal point for security,  
receipt, control, storage, and dissemination of SCI in each  
accredited facility. This concept is effective in customer-  
oriented situations but not in a producer-oriented environment  
where large volumes of information are received and dispatched  
daily.

d. In recognition of NSA's concern over a central control  
point, the DCID was modified to provide an alternative in

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SUBJECT: Proposed DCID 1/XX, "Uniform Procedures for Administrative Handling and Accountability of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)"


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instances where it is not practical, permitting an NFIB member to establish the control mechanism on the basis of selected components within an agency or department. Their concern about the CISR is not shared. All SCI, including COMINT, requires similar control procedures. Furthermore, applicable portions of the CISR were used as a guide in preparing this proposed regulation.

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3.  Recommendation: That you approve the circulation of the attached DCID to NFIB for vote sheet action.

  
John N. McMahon

Attachment:  
Draft DCID



APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: 19 DEC 1977

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
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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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2 March 1978



MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.,  
USAF  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation [redacted] 25X1

REFERENCE: S-8334-RSS-4B, dated 3 January 1978,  
subject: Proposed DCID on  
Compartmentation

25X1 [redacted] Your memorandum (see reference) raises some valid points about the progress of various actions bearing on security compartmentation. The proposed compartmentation DCID you noted is but one of several draft directives on this general subject which require resolution. Since the delays in coming to grips with these issues seem to reflect underlying philosophical differences in the Community on how to deal with the need for and impact of compartmentation, I plan to schedule an NFIB discussion on the subject on 14 March. That should help us determine what organizational arrangements and assignments of responsibility we will need to balance the full range of Community interests in the protection and use of sensitive intelligence.



STANSFIELD TURNER  
Chairman

SECRET

Classified by [redacted]	[redacted]
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 13526	
exemption schedule 5d (1), (2), (3)	
Automatically declassified on	
Date Impractical to Determine	

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Security Committee

SECOM-D-306  
27 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walter Elder  
Executive Secretary, NFIB

25X1A FROM: [REDACTED]  
Acting Chairman  
SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation [REDACTED]  
REFERENCE: DCI/IC 78-5006, dated 12 January 1978, subject:  
Proposed DCID on Compartmentation

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25X1 1. [REDACTED] This responds to your request (reference) for an identification of issues and problems bearing on compartmentation, and a description of who is doing what about them.

25X1 2. [REDACTED] As you noted, General Tighe's recent memorandum soliciting DCI support for early NFIB action on a proposed DCID on compartmentation is but one of several recent expressions of concern from Defense about the pace of pending actions on compartmentation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff brought up the subject for discussion during their 20 January 1978 meeting with the DCI.

25X1 3. [REDACTED] The proposed compartmentation DCID derives from a 1976 initiative by Defense, presented as a means of redressing the balance between protection and utility of intelligence information. That initiative was referred to the Security Committee. Sharp divisions in the Community have stalled action at our level on trying to develop a directive establishing clear policies on what should be compartmented and effective procedures for doing so. Those with a "collection" orientation generally favor the status quo, under which the DCI collection committees or program managers both assert what needs to be compartmented and develop the protective measures they deem appropriate. Those with a "user" orientation want a change which would provide a better balance between a collector's assertions on restrictive security measures and the users' needs to get the collected information in a manner which permits its full and timely application. The "users" generally view present arrangements as institutionalizing a bias in favor of strict protection and unreceptive to Community needs for access under readily manageable conditions.

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A majority on the Security Committee sought to attain this improved balance through having the proposed DCID make the Committee itself responsible for determining what needs to be compartmented. A copy of their proposed DCID is attached for information (see Attachment A). The Committee Staff, believing that neither it nor the Committee as a collegial body has the technical expertise to make such a determination, proposed a different approach without much success. That approach is that: (1) those intimately knowledgeable of the collection environment propose information elements for compartmentation; (2) the Security Committee comment on the feasibility of protecting the information at both compartmented and non-compartmented classified levels; (3) Community agencies with interests in using the information comment on the impact the compartmentation proposal would have on their responsibilities; (4) a senior staff advisor to the DCI review these inputs from an overall Community point of view and recommend a balanced position to the DCI for final approval; and (5) the Security Committee play the leading role in developing the administrative procedures to apply the DCI's decision.

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4. [ ] The slow pace of action on the proposed compartmentation DCID is unfortunately paralleled in other actions underway which bear on compartmentation in some manner. Some of the delay is due to the complexity of the subject and to the need for wide-ranging coordination. In other cases, different problems have contributed to slow action. In any event, the lack of much in the way of specific accomplishment fuels the concerns expressed by DIA. Significant pending actions bearing on compartmentation include:

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a. [ ] Simplification of security policy for space intelligence matters. A proposal on this was developed by an ad hoc Community group convened by the DCI in January 1976. Specific recommendations were sent to the President by the DCI in November 1976, but were held over and subsumed in the space policy review (PRM-23). The security recommendations from that are very close to the November 1976 ones, but are not yet final pending further consideration of the draft Presidential Directive. Until this is acted upon, no changes can be made in the system of security controls for intelligence satellite product. The Security Committee staff provided support on security issues involved in this effort.

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b. [ ] Revision of Executive Order 11652 on security classification. The new draft Order developed in response to PRM-29 will require, among other things, that intelligence compartments be continued or established only upon personal DCI approval after consideration of the balance between protection and use and assessment of attendant security factors. Compartments will also be subject to periodic

SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation

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review requirements leading to cancellation, change, or re-affirmation. A mechanism to support the DCI in these regards is needed. A Security Committee staff member participated in the PRM-29 effort and was one of the drafters for the new Order.

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c.  Central computer data base to record and manage compartmented accesses. The NFIB concurred in a concept for such (the 4C's System) in 1975, but disagreement on funding precluded implementation; funding is still an issue. Further examination of the concept suggests that its management benefits are well worth the cost. The Security Committee is staffing a new proposal on this system for DCI consideration.

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d.  Uniform administrative system for compartmented data. The Security Committee developed, and the NFIB has for comment, a proposed DCID to bring all administrative procedures for handling and controlling such data together into one regulation. Some agency comments on the proposal counsel delay until the new Executive Order on security classification is approved.

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e.  Updating of Community security policy on travel and assignment of persons with compartmented access. Strong Community differences on the subject have delayed decision. Legal issues were raised and explored. The Security Committee has developed, and the NFIB has for comment, an up-to-date proposed DCID on this matter. Comments show that Community differences will have to be resolved by DCI decision.

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f.  Updating of the TALENT-KEYHOLE Manual. COMIREX has completed a several-year-long effort to draft a revision of the manual, consolidating all existing provisions bearing on T-K matters, and will shortly seek DCI approval for the changes involved.

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g.  Updating of the Communication Intelligence Security Regulations. The SIGINT Committee has been working for about a year on a draft revision of this directive. More review and coordination is needed.

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5.  A factor that does not contribute to timely action on security matters is the division of responsibility for the subject, both by directive and by practice. With regard to compartmentation:

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a.  DCID 1/11, the Security Committee's charter, assigns a mission to "review special security and compartmentation

procedures and develop proposals for any necessary changes to achieve optimum use of intelligence consistent with protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods." Notwithstanding that, a recent proposal to subdivide a [redacted] compartment into two separate ones was not assigned to the Security Committee for action.

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b. [redacted] COMIREX, which is primarily responsible for advising on the collection, processing, and exploitation of imagery, is also tasked by its charter (DCID 1/13) to develop "special security control" procedures for imagery product. They, not the Security Committee, develop the administrative directives specifying how such product is to be protected.

c. [redacted] The SIGINT Committee, which is primarily responsible for advising on the collection and use of SIGINT, is tasked by its charter (DCID 6/1) to study and prepare recommendations on the "degree and type of security protection" to be afforded SIGINT and on associated administrative procedures.

d. [redacted] An ad hoc group, not the Security Committee, was tasked last year to review security and compartmentation from an overall Community standpoint and to develop implementation plans for improvements. This, the Senior Security Study Group, was set up in response to a suggestion by the then Director, DIA, who believed that such would accelerate the pace of meaningful action on compartmentation.

6. [redacted] Both policy and practice show that the DCI does not have a single focal point for Community security policy matters, as opposed to a single security advisor for operational security matters bearing on CIA. The concerns increasingly voiced by Defense are of Community character. They appear to seek an institutional approach which would give both the substance and the appearance of balanced consideration of the competing parochial interests of separate Community entities. Some arrangement to that effect will be needed to comply with the revision of E.O. 11652, which will require the protective features of present and proposed compartments to be balanced against the "full spectrum of needs to use the information" involved. It would seem that that balance would not be served by permitting either collectors or consumers to have a preponderant role in recommending security policy. Both have to contribute to the process, because no one else can speak with their experience and technical knowledge. But someone without a vested interest in the outcome should be closely involved in the balancing process and in the follow-through administration after the DCI has made his decision.

SUBJECT: Approved For Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070008-4  
Security Compartmentation

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7. [REDACTED] Attached for your consideration is a suggested reply (Attachment B) for the DCI to send General Tighe. It states a plan to schedule an NFIB discussion on compartmentation, on the assumption that the DCI would believe such necessary and desirable. If the DCI concurs in such an approach, we will prepare a talking paper for his use.

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Attachments:

- A. Proposed DCID on Compartmentation
- B. DCI Memo to D/DIA

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Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070008-4

**Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070008-4